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CAMEROON - Education Under Attack: An Urgent Policy Brief

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During the past month, the first of the 2020-2021 academic year, there has been a surge in the number and intensity of attacks against the educational system in Cameroon's historically Anglophone regions, the Northwest (NW) and the Southwest (SW). The most dramatic of these incidents occurred on 24 October 2020 in Kumba, Meme Division, SW Region, during which armed gunmen stormed into a secondary school classroom, and shot at the students, killing seven (7) and injuring at least thirteen (13).

This Policy Brief provides (I) an overview of this new wave of attacks against education in Cameroon's 4-year long Anglophone crisis, (II) explains the background to parties to the conflict specifically targeting the education system for attack, and (III) makes policy recommendations to bring pressure on the said actors, to immediately desist from this practice, which potentially constitutes a war crime and one of the gravest violations committed against children, in a context of armed conflict.

I. THE RECENT INCIDENTS:

- On Saturday 24 October 2020, armed gunmen traveling on motorbikes stormed a secondary school, the Mother Francisca International Bilingual Academy in Fiango, Kumba, Meme Division, SW Region. They entered classrooms and shot at students at point blank range, killing 7 students, and wounding 13. The gunmen escaped from the scene, although Cameroon's Government has reported having killed one of the perpetrators in a subsequent military raid. The killed and wounded victims were between 9 and 14 years of age.ⁱ
- On Tuesday 3 November 2020, armed gunmen entered the Presbyterian School of Kumbo, Bui Division, NW Region, and chased away all the students from the school. They then abducted 11 teachers from the school and held them in captivity for 2 days before releasing them.ⁱⁱ

- On the same Tuesday 3 *November 2020*, armed men are reported to have entered Longla Comprehensive College, a secondary school in Bamenda, Mezam Division, NW Region. They are reported to have opened fire on the school's premises before fleeing.ⁱⁱⁱ
- On Wednesday 4 *November 2020*, armed gunmen attacked Kulu Memorial College, a secondary school located at Mile 4, Limbe, SW Region. The gunmen headed to classrooms, and while filming them, made the students (girls and boys) strip naked, and threatened to douse them in petrol and burn them. The gunmen then chased the students while stripped, away from their classes and the school campus, before setting parts of the school on fire.^{iv}
- It should be noted that no specific armed group has claimed responsibility for these incidents. Cameroon's Government has indicated that they were committed by armed separatist groups active in both regions.^v A number of the separatist groups either blame one another,^{vi} or claim Government troops committed the attacks.^{vii}

II. ANALYSIS : WHY THE RENEWED ATTACKS AGAINST EDUCATION?

A crisis with origins in education system discontent

It is important to recall that while these recent incidents represent a noticeable spike in the number, frequency, and intensity of attacks against education (including the fatal incident of direct killing of students, simply for being in school), these are not the first attacks against education in Cameroon's Anglophone crisis. In 2017 and in 2018, at the start of the crisis, a large number of school arsons, violence, and abductions of students and teachers were committed in both Regions – those incidents have been amply documented.^{viii}

Understanding this dynamic of deliberate attacks against schools and education, which begins to place Cameroon's crisis within the same frame of analysis as on-going or recent conflicts in which belligerents specifically seek out schools for attack, such as Afghanistan (Taliban), northern Nigeria (Boko Haram), the Sahel and Burkina Faso (jihadist armed elements), requires some understanding of the Anglophone crisis' drivers.

Reflecting its bilingual character, Cameroon runs two separate educational system tracks for Nursery, Primary, Secondary, and University education : one in French, another in English. The English educational system has its historical roots in the Northwest and Southwest regions. The crisis which began in 2016, had as one of its triggers, discontent in the two regions (where English is the principally used language) over what was considered to be a degradation of the English-based educational system, which those regions' inhabitants primarily use. The main points of contention revolved around posting of teachers with French as a first language to schools in the 2 Regions, and the complaint that the English sub-system was being made subservient or subordinate to the French – by

receiving concepts from it. These complaints underlay a school strike initiated by English system teachers' unions in the 2 regions.

Conflict path : from education union strikes, to civil disobedience, to armed insurgency

As the crisis evolved, the teacher (and lawyer) unions would become progressively effaced from the centre of the movement for Anglophone demands. In their stead would emerge, from late 2017 a constellation of more political and radical actors – including pro-separatist groups that had historically existed in Cameroon's Anglophone region, but previously constituted a marginal force. These would re-mobilize (especially drawing on a large diaspora from the 2 Regions outside the country) to become an *armed insurgency*, which is bifurcated: its *political and communications leadership* based abroad, and its *armed fighters* constituted into fragmented groups operating across the 13 administrative divisions, that make up the Northwest and Southwest regions.

When English-speaking *teachers' union's* strikes boiled over into conflict late in 2017, the resulting *armed insurgency* that now seeks separation of those regions from Cameroon, took up the education sector as one of its *casus belli*. In these pro-separatist groups' communications and mobilization, they see the war they are fighting as in significant part, about education – namely restoring some form of education system for the Regions, unadulterated by influences from Cameroon's central authorities, which they perceive as French-dominated. In the conflict, one stated objective the said groups seek is to “wrest away” from central Government authority, control of the educational system used in the 2 regions.^{ix}

In a conflict where the education sector is itself considered to be one of the points of contention (such as where armed groups are fighting against the central State for control of the education system) as is the case in Cameroon, there is a *heightened risk* that education will not only constitute a source of political tensions, but that schools will become the actual “battleground” on which the conflict is fought.

Earlier in the crisis, as it transformed from *peaceful teacher unions' strikes*, to *civil disobedience*, and then *into an armed insurgency*, between 2016 and 2018, a *school boycott* was extensively relied upon by the various groups that were seeking to extract concessions from Cameroon's central State authorities, including greater regional control of the educational system in the Northwest and Southwest regions.

Origins in Enforcing a School Boycott and preventing social normalcy

Due to the above very specific origins of the crisis (being in part a conflict over education) *policing of the school boycott* would become one of the early tasks to which the separatist armed groups would employ themselves. The argumentation advanced by this camp disagreed with learners, educators, or parents *opting out of the school strike* in order to

send their children to school. It should be noted that while protecting the educational system in English is a point of solidarity among the country's English-language users particularly in the NW and SW Regions, many parents, learners, and educators became progressively concerned about the implications of an indefinite school strike in both regions. (The 2016 – 2017 academic year was lost for most students in the 2 Regions, who had to repeat the entire academic year due to time lost during the school strike).^x

The separatist fighters would thus take to “policing” the school strike/boycott amidst a population that was weary of indefinite school closures. The result would be, between 2017 and 2019, a very large number of attacks perpetrated against the educational system in the 2 Regions. These would include illustratively : (i) attacks against learners on their way to school in uniforms (obliging many students in the regions to shun the standard practice of wearing uniforms),^{xi} (ii) abduction of students from schools in particular from residential boarding schools, and holding them in captivity for days,^{xii} (iii) the collection of ransoms to release students and teachers abducted from schools,^{xiii} (iv) arsons, destruction, and burnings of schools,^{xiv} and (v) violent attacks against students, such as University sports teams preparing for collegiate competitions.^{xv}

The result of these attacks and harassment of the educational system in the NW and SW Regions has been to saddle the educational system significantly. Through 2019, school enrolment rates (which had improved from 2016-17) remained all the same low ^{xvi} : many learners had fled schools in the 2 regions to re-enrol elsewhere in the country, while many schools in the 2 regions (especially those located far from major towns, and thus difficult to protect, and more vulnerable to armed bands' attacks) simply closed down.

An additional animus behind disrupting educational activities in both regions is a more general objective among separatist groups to disrupt organised life and make the situation “unbearable” and “ungovernable” in the two regions.^{xvii} They see this as a means of attracting international attention to the crisis, and also demonstrating that the State is incapable of exercising its prerogatives in the 2 regions. This implies a permanent level of civil disobedience, and disruption of administrative, official, economic, and educational activities in the two regions – both as a defiance of the State's authority, and in the hope of extracting Government concessions or an international mediation.

The disruption objective implies that *routine activities of the civilian population (such as school attendance) may be interpreted as lack of solidarity* with the separatist cause. School-goers in this theory, would constitute part of those termed “blacklegs”, meaning any Anglophone who was not taking an active part in, or supporting activities of the armed insurgency. Functioning of schools would thus constitute unwelcome normalcy.

The 2020 conflagration: renewed and deeper violence against schools?

The recent renewed spate of attacks against education in the two regions appears cast in the same conflicts over education, and the fact that actors in the crisis have failed to keep

education as such, and the institutions, learners, and teachers engaged in it, spared from being direct targets in the crisis. In the build-up to the start of the 2020-2021 school year during the autumn of 2020, Government and several stakeholders (as they have done in previous years) pushed for schools to be allowed to resume in the two regions.

By the start of the 2019 and 2020 academic years, the posture of the pro-separation groups had evolved from their initial stance of appearing to place an indefinite hold on education in both regions (while the conflict persists) – reflecting the fatigue, and internal dissensions among the insurgent groups over maintaining an indefinite school boycott. Instead, a number of these groups issued tracts indicating they would allow schools to re-open in these 2 regions.^{xviii} However out of the usual three principal purveyors of education (State, confessional, and lay private schools), they indicated that *State-owned* schools would not be allowed to function in both regions. They stated the said schools would be replaced by what they termed “community” schools (which, if existent, would be improvised, makeshift facilities run under the supervision of separatist groups).^{xix}

For context, the non-State armed groups in the NW and SW regions do not “hold” territory or exercise State-like governance functions, which would enable them to run schools. The tracts also required that no learners would wear uniforms, that Cameroon’s anthem not be sung, that the Cameroon flag not be hoisted on school premises, and that no learning of French or teaching of Cameroon’s history (to include the previously French-administered part) be done in schools. The nature of these conditions on the resumption of education underscores the fact that actors in the crisis (pro-separation groups) continue to see the education system as an area through which to pursue their demands, and would disrupt its functioning as a consequence of those demands not being met.

Denigration of school attendance

Circumstantial material (especially assailant-recorded videos) observed from school attacks or other incidents involving separatist fighters in recent weeks, reinforce the assessment that these groups continue to see blockage of educational institutions as a “legitimate” tool in their struggle.

This includes remarks by assailants denigrating school attendance or questioning the relevance of attending school while the two regions are in crisis. In the arson attack on Kulu Memorial College in Limbe in November 2020, one of the assailants can be heard (in recorded video), asking the students who had been stripped and humiliated “Do you want to go to school?” (to which the frightened students murmured in the negative).^{xx} In a separate video after the abduction of a major traditional ruler (the Fon of Nso, Bui Division, NW Region) in November 2020, the abductors questioned the Fon extensively on his position as to whether schools should be going on in both Regions – in a line of questioning that appeared to expect the interviewee to respond in the negative.^{xxi}

It should be noted however that some pro-separation actors have, in the wake of the Kumba school killings, condemned the attacks against schools (noting they could constitute war crimes), and also questioned the wisdom of pursuing and enforcing an indefinite school boycott as a strategy to prosecute the conflict.^{xxii} This signals an emerging divergence of positions on this strategy which was initially shared by most of the pro-separation actors.

Contesting central State controlled education as pro-separation ideology

Key to understanding the pressure on, and direct targeting of schools in the crisis is the specific reproach that pro-separation, separatist groups ascribe to the education system – meaning Cameroon’s current educational system managed by the central State authorities. In effect, the position of these groups has been to question the value of the education offered in these institutions. Under this logic, schools under Cameroon’s current educational system are perceived as schools of the “oppressor” or the “colonizer” – allusions to a key facet of separatist thought which considers Cameroon’s Government to be treating the 2 regions like an oppressor or colonizing State. In their logic, schools and education would resume under a new, idealized, separate State, which would establish (or restore) its own separate system of education.^{xxiii}

In the aftermath of the 1 October 2017 events to proclaim the said breakaway State, and prior to the arrest in Nigeria and transfer to Cameroon in January 2018 of the principal pro-separation leaders, one of their main promised agendas was to develop a new educational curriculum that would be used in those regions. This suggests the centrality of education as an issue or area of contestation in the wider crisis. It should also be noted that cementing the linkage between education union strikes, resulting civil disobedience, and the eventual start of an armed insurgency, some of the leaders of the education unions that started the school strike at the end of 2016 fled into exile and joined what would become the pro-separation leadership in exile (out of the country), again placing education centrally in the crisis’ dynamics.

III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Faced with this resurgence of school attacks, a three-pronged approach is recommended in order to curb and contain the problem in the short-term, while laying the foundations to address it as part of broader long-term resolution of the conflict.

Protecting Education from Attack

A first order priority would be a series of measures to protect education (learners, teachers, and schools) from attack. These include security measures, such as those expected to be taken following visits by Cameroon’s defence and security chiefs to the Southwest and Northwest regions, in the aftermath of the recent school attacks.^{xxiv} Such measures could include reinforced intelligence-gathering, patrols, and presence which dissuades the commission of attacks against schools. Non-complacent security assessments also need to

be undertaken to determine areas which may (for the time-being) not fulfil the security conditions for schools to operate in – in order not to endanger students by allowing schools to function in areas where they may be vulnerable to attack.

In addition to physical protection of education, it is imperative that specific awareness-raising efforts be directed towards the leadership, communicators, and on-the-ground combatants of pro-separation armed groups. Anecdotal evidence from the statements of the said groups suggest that their levels of awareness of the basic principles of international humanitarian law (IHL), the rules and laws which govern what combatants may, and may not do, during armed conflict, is quite modest. It should also be borne in mind that the groups on the ground are fragmented and not under a unified or consolidated command, hence the difficulty of sending down orders through unified command chains.

In this regard, IHL awareness material, preferably in English and in Pidgin English (a Krio variant widely spoken in both regions), and with appropriate illustrations, should be widely disseminated across the 2 Regions, in print format, as spots over radio and television, and in animated video spots for distribution through social media on handheld devices – which are widely used in both regions. These materials should seek to foster awareness of the basic rules of war such as distinction between civilians and combatants, and the prohibition of attacks against protected objects (such as schools, hospitals, and places of worship). Presented under the neutral banner of international humanitarian law, this information can help inform and dissuade armed actors from deliberately targeting schools and generate a discussion over the inappropriateness of doing so.

Another loophole to close in offering protection for schools (and other protected places) from attack is for Cameroon's authorities to strengthen the legal sanctions for such acts, under Cameroonian law. Presently, Cameroonian criminal law does not provide for the offences of *war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide*. In the context of a legally established armed conflict, attacks against schools would constitute a war crime, an internationally condemned form of criminal conduct.

Cameroon's laws only provide that jurisdiction to try these 3 gravest international crimes falls with Military Tribunals. However, there is no definition of the said offences under Cameroonian law, and their penalties.^{xxv} Their inclusion into Cameroon's criminal laws will send a strong signal to all actors engaged in armed activities in the country (whether in the Far North region, or the NW-SW regions). These offences against the laws of war are also more specific and appropriate to use for such incidents, than the offence of terrorism.

United Nations Listing of Parties to the Conflict who Attack Schools

A second important measure to put a halt to these attacks against education in Cameroon's NW and SW regions, would be for the United Nations to place the parties (entities) who are ordering, instigating, or committing attacks against schools and education, on the U.N. Security Council's global blacklist of parties to conflict who attack schools. The United

Nations has a procedure pertaining to Children and Armed Conflict, under which it blacklists parties to conflicts around the world, which engage in the gravest forms of violence against children during wars, such as recruiting or using child soldiers, rape and sexual violence against children and girls, and attacks against schools.

In effect, in its Resolution No. 1998 of 12 July 2011, the U.N. Security Council requested:

[The U.N.] Secretary General to also include in the annexes to his [annual] reports on children and armed conflict those parties to armed conflict that engage, in contravention of applicable international law: (a) in *recurrent attacks on schools and/or hospitals*, (b) in *recurrent attacks or threats of attacks against protected persons* (meaning *civilians*, such as learners or teachers) *in relation to schools and/or hospitals in situations of armed conflict*, bearing in mind all other violations and abuses committed against children.^{xxvi}

The Blacklist, which is included in an Annex to a Report of the U.N. Secretary General to the Security Council, basically contains a verified list of parties to armed conflicts around the world (which can be States or non-State armed groups) who engage in these worst forms of violations against children during periods of armed conflicts. Placement on the said list constitutes a major delegitimization of the methods of warfare of the said entity and brings its activities under the scrutiny of the world's key powers and institutions. Only when the listed entity has taken appropriate measures to desist from the incriminated practice can it be delisted.

In this regard, it should be noted that in the most recent report of the U.N. Secretary General to the Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict, dated 9 June 2020, the Secretary General stated as follows:

In view of the gravity and number of violations reported and, where possible, verified in **Cameroon**, [namely] recruitment and use [of children in armed conflict], killing and maiming, abduction [of children], attacks on schools and hospitals, and denial of humanitarian access, and in Burkina Faso (attacks on schools, and killing and maiming) during 2019, **both countries will be added as situations of concern with immediate effect and will be included in my next report.** (Paragraph 243).^{xxvii}

The above implies that the process has already begun to monitor the activities of armed entities and actors operating in Cameroon, as to whether they are committing any of the prohibited grave acts against children in armed conflict. And that the next report of the Secretary General to the Security Council will contain information as to incidents of violence against children, and *potentially* the designation of parties to the conflict that were responsible for same.

It should be underscored that the inclusion of Cameroon as a “situation of concern” as from the present year in this United Nations mechanism to monitor the gravest violations in armed conflict against children, will neither be limited to monitoring attacks against schools and education, nor confined to any one actor in the conflict. Rather, this UN mechanism will be monitoring the commission of *any of the gravest violations* against children in conflict, namely: (i) recruitment and use of children in armed entities, (ii) killing and maiming of children, (iii) rape and other forms of sexual violence against children, (iv) attacks on schools and/or hospitals, (v) abductions of children, and (vi) denial of humanitarian relief access for children.^{xxviii} Its watch will also extend to all actors engaged in the crisis, be they State forces, or non-State armed entities. This should put on notice entities responsible for attacks against education *and* other grave violations against children, that the global watch has begun.

Long-Term Conflict Prevention: Making education policy part of the crisis’ resolution

While taking the above immediate, near-term measures to end grave attacks against education, schools, and children in the two Regions, it is important for stakeholders in Cameroon, notably the Government, the UN system, development partners engaged in Education Sector support (notably the World Bank), and other national actors, *to factor education into the broader policy mix required to resolve the Anglophone crisis*. As the analysis above indicates, an integral part of resolving the crisis afflicting the two regions entails examining why the education system became such a bone of contention, and supporting national actors to put in place policies that de-escalate education as an area for contestation in the future. In this regard, policy-makers’ attention is drawn to the considerations below:

1. The education sector approach required on the crisis in the historically Anglophone regions is not only to *protect education in conflict* as a humanitarian intervention, but to *resolve conflict over education* – as a critical ingredient for long-term management of national co-existence between official language systems and communities in Cameroon. It is critical through Policy Dialogue, to identify the contours of this latter issue, encouraging national authorities to open spaces to address it, rather than minimize its significance in the escalation of the crisis.
2. There is specific expertise globally, within frameworks such as language-in-education policies, education in multi-lingual countries, and minority education systems, to support countries develop the *sectoral policies and institutional arrangements* needed to accommodate concurrent education systems in different languages, within the same country. This includes experience from officially multilingual countries. Such expertise is highly needed at policy level, in Cameroon.^{xxix}

3. In centrifugal conflicts, in which regions of a country are making demands for greater control or autonomy over certain aspects of their existence, analysts and practitioners resolving such conflicts *should not under-estimate the importance that centrifugal groups afford to education*. Keen scholars of conflicts over regional autonomy, such as the late U.S. political scientist, Professor Alfred Stepan, have noted that autonomy demands often seek to assert power over “*the vital culture-making and culture-preserving powers such as ... control over the content and administration of education*”.^{xxx} Centrifugal groups often see education as key to group preservation, since it constitutes the method of reproducing identities and passing down values inter-generationally.
4. *Education sector devolution* is also an important policy consideration. Cameroon has recently established the laws (December 2019 General Code on Regional and Local Authorities) to allow for the first time, significant devolution of the administration and management of schools (nursery, primary, and secondary) to its lower tiers of sub-national institutions, namely its 10 Regions, and 360 Local (Government) Councils. At the same time, in pursuance of an approach to *asymmetrical devolution* which the Government proposes as a response to the Anglophone crisis, it needs to be figured out how exactly these 2 Regions will relate to the education system in English.

The above-mentioned law provides that a “*Special Status [granted only to the NW-SW Regions] shall also entail respect for the peculiarity of the Anglophone education system*” (Section 3.3), and that the NW and SW Regions shall exercise as additional, asymmetrically devolved powers “*participating in the formulation of national public policies relating to the Anglophone education sub-system*”. This framework for how Central and Regional authorities will engage over education policy, needs careful articulation and balancing over the long-term, in order to mitigate and prevent conflict in the education sector.

5. Conflict over policies governing the dual, concurrent education sub-systems (in English and French) and management of the English education sub-system, *are not a new occurrence in Cameroon*.^{xxxi} Neither did they begin with events shortly before the start of the crisis in 2016. Education sector historians, and keen observers of Cameroon’s concurrent official language legacies have documented that these conflicts began right after reunification of the previously French and British administered parts of the country (in the 1960s), and re-emerged on a periodic basis in every decade thereafter, over issues such as proposed fusion of the two education sub-systems, compulsory school learning of the 2nd official language, equal access to University education in both official languages, central management of English system examination certifications, and cross-access to English-based education by primary French speakers. This points to a sectoral challenge that is *recurrent and systemic* – and Cameroon’s highest authorities have admitted that despite their best

efforts, the two official language education systems still exhibit differences, and need work to co-exist.^{xxxii}

6. Long-term policy measures to reduce conflict in, and over the education sector should include the *complex questions around language choice, language migration, and evolving language demand, which influence attitudes towards the various education sub-systems*. The English education sub-system, once a relatively insular system that predominated in the 2 historically English-speaking regions, and attracted learners whose parents primarily used English as an official language, has in the past 2 decades become highly sought after by families who historically used French as their primary official language (a phenomenon driven by globalization).^{xxxiii} This has increased language-communities' contact, and with it, the potential for conflict. Keen as they are to preserve an Anglophone education system seen as their heritage, Cameroon's historical English-speakers are today faced with "competition" for use/enrolment in the system, from other communities.

END

Research Endnotes (Open-Source):

ⁱ <http://www.cameroon-info.net/article/cameroun-tuerie-en-milieu-scolaire-a-kumba-voici-la-liste-des-victimes-386466.html>; <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/24/five-children-killed-in-attack-on-cameroonian-school-officials>.

ⁱⁱ <http://www.cameroon-info.net/article/cameroon-anglophone-crisis-gunmen-kidnap-11-staff-members-of-presbyterian-school-kumbo-386967.html>; <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/cameroon-11-kidnapped-teachers-freed/2033969>.

ⁱⁱⁱ <http://www.cameroon-info.net/article/cameroon-government-reacts-to-attacks-on-lcc-mankon-ps-kumbo-kulu-memorial-college-limbe-387069.html>.

^{iv} <http://www.cameroon-info.net/article/cameroon-anglophone-crisis-gunmen-attack-kulu-memorial-college-limbe-students-stripped-naked-classes-set-387048.html>.

^v <http://www.cameroon-info.net/article/cameroun-massacre-de-kumba-le-gouvernement-note-que-lecole-attaquee-a-lance-ses-activites-386439.html>.

^{vi} <http://www.cameroon-info.net/article/cameroun-massacre-dans-une-ecole-a-kumba-ayuk-tabe-leader-separatiste-condamne-et-accuse-386451.html>.

^{vii} <https://cameroonnewsagency.com/massacre-in-kumba-school-amba-govt-play-blame-game/>.

^{viii} <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/06/cameroon-anglophone-regions-gripped-by-deadly-violence/>; <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/23/camerouns-schools-are-under-attack-and-uk-can-help-stop-it>; <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/12/targeted-going-school-cameroon>.

^{ix} <https://www.ambazoniagov.org/index.php/departments1/departement-education>; <https://www.bareta.news/governing-council-launches-education-department-website/>; <https://ambaedu.org/>; <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/07/24/cameroon-education-has-become-victim-war>.

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- ^x <https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/2017-gce-examinations-board-records-worst-results-yet/>;
<https://actuacameroon.com/2017/03/01/cameroon-anglophone-crisis-students-boycott-gce-exams-board-records-low-registration/>.
- ^{xi} <https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/teachers-murdered-and-schools-attacked-rebels-cameroon>.
- ^{xii} <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/05/cameroon-pupils-kidnapped-boarding-school-bamenda>.
- ^{xiii} <https://apnews.com/article/edd1363688524e76843e886c6ffce0aa>; <https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/79-students-kidnapped-school-cameroon-are-freed>.
- ^{xiv} <https://www.voanews.com/africa/cameroon-school-set-fire-anglophone-strike-deepens>.
- ^{xv} <https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/cameroon-kidnapped-ub-athletes-tortured-traumatised/>;
<https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/cameroon-kidnapped-buea-university-athletes-released/>.
- ^{xvi} <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/op%C3%A9rations/cameroon/document/education-cluster-strategy-north-west-and-south-west-nwsw-2020> (see charts for school attendance data).
- ^{xvii} <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45723211>; <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/may/30/cameroon-killings-escalate-anglophone-crisis>;
<https://acleddata.com/2018/09/21/picking-a-fight-the-rise-of-armed-separatists-in-cameroon/>. (Note the statements attributed to principal separatist leaders).
- ^{xviii} <https://mimimefoinfos.com/cameroon-ambazonian-fighters-approve-school-resumption-throughout-northwest-southwest-regions/>.
- ^{xix} <https://www.voanews.com/africa/cameroon-separatists-open-community-schools>;
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- ^{xxiv} <http://www.cameroon-info.net/article/cameroon-crise-anglophone-apres-les-attaques-dans-les-ecoles-le-ministre-de-la-defense-387381.html>.
- ^{xxv} <https://www.prc.cm/en/news/the-acts/laws/1829-law-no-2016-007-of-12-july-2016-relating-to-the-penal-code>;
<https://www.prc.cm/en/news/the-acts/laws/2358-law-no-2017-012-of-12-july-2017-to-lay-down-the-code-of-military-justice> (see section 8, Military Justice Code).
- ^{xxvi} <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/document/resolution-1998-2011/>.
- ^{xxvii} https://www.un.org/sg/sites/www.un.org.sg/files/atoms/files/15-June-2020_Secretary-General_Report_on_CAAC_Eng.pdf.
- ^{xxviii} <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/six-grave-violations/>.
- ^{xxix} See very generally: <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-list/education-in-a-multilingual-world-unesco-education-position-paper/>; <https://www.osce.org/hcnm/hague-recommendations>; <https://www.cal.org/lpren/pdfs/briefs/conflict-language-rights-and-education.pdf>.
- ^{xxx} Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz, Yogendra Yadav, *Federacy: A Formula for democratically managing multinational societies in Unitary States*, IN *Crafting State-Nations : India and other Multinational Democracies*, at pp 205. JHU Press, 2011.
- ^{xxxi} For relevant historical context on education sector conflict along the official language lines in Cameroon, see: https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/petrich_education_conflict_cameroon_2020.pdf. See also for the separate development of the French/English education sub-systems: https://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/divers17-12/02031.pdf; http://www.persee.fr/doc/tiers_0040-7356_1978_num_19_76_2832; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325999416_British_and_French_Implementation_of_Colonial_Educational_policies_in_Cameroon_1916-1961_A_Comparative_Analysis.
- ^{xxxii} <https://www.investiraucameroun.com/economie/1311-13564-forum-de-paris-sur-la-paix-paul-biya-explique-la-crise-anglophone-en-cours-au-cameroon>.
- ^{xxxiii} See generally : <http://www.ens.cm/syllabus/index.php/SYLABUS/article/view/47>.